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Starting with Krugman (1980), much literature has analyzed how
trade liberalization aﬀects the economy based on the notion that trade
is motivated by consumer’s love of variety. In this paper, I augment
these preferences by the determinants of demand for heterogeneous
products. The model features products with heterogeneous attributes
and consumers with heterogeneous tastes for attributes. Allowing for
international trade, the model predicts a within-industry home market
eﬀect, i.e., that high domestic demand for an attribute leads to entry
of ﬁrms producing a ﬁtting output and, consequently, net exports of
products embodying the attribute. Second, the model rationalizes why
consumption is home-biased in the short run. Each country’s indus-
try is optimized for the preferences of domestic consumers and thus
somewhat inappropriate for the export market. Third, in the long
run, countries specialize further and the within-industry home mar-
ket eﬀect intensiﬁes. Intriguingly, (as long as it is incomplete) this
specialization implies that the home bias disappears completely, thus
demonstrating that Linder’s (1961) conjecture describes a temporary
phenomenon that does not prevail in general equilibrium.
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11 Introduction
Starting with the seminal work of Krugman (1979, 1980, and 1981), in-
creasing returns that arise from consumer’s “love of variety” (or from their
similar search for the “ideal variety” as in Lancaster (1980)) have been
regarded as the major motive for international trade. Due to their intu-
itive appeal and analytical tractability, the preferences of Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) that Krugman’s analysis is based upon have become the workhorse
of international trade theory.
While trade theorists continue to gain important insights from using
these preferences, they also mask signiﬁcant aspects of product demand.
For example, the classical Armington (1969) assumption that consumption
is diﬀerentiated by the location of production is often needed to match ag-
gregate trade patterns (Treﬂer (1995)), yet it remains somewhat unclear
why this is the case and why the expenditure share on foreign goods is gen-
erally rather small. Also more recent ﬁndings that there are pronounced
systematic patterns in the quality composition of production, trade, and
consumption (Schott (2004), Hummels and Klenow (2005), Hallak (2006
and forthcoming), Hallak and Schott (2009))1 or that intra-industry trade
volume can best be explained by factors that are speciﬁc to country-pairs
(Hummels and Levinson (1995)) are not easily rationalized in frameworks
based on the Dixit and Stiglitz preference framework.
It is worthwhile to examine which underlying preference structure of
rational agents can explain these patterns of trade and to then analyze how
trade liberalization aﬀects the aggregate economy once these preference are
properly modeled. For example, as famously conjectured by Linder (1961,
p. 94), it is likely that "[t]he more similar is the demand structure of two
countries, the more intensive, potentially, is the trade between these two
countries." Implicit in Linder’s hypothesis is the argument that domestic
ﬁrms tend to produce goods that are optimized for the local taste and less
for the taste of foreign consumers. Consequently, diﬀerences in the tastes and
products impede trade and reduce the welfare gains from trade liberalization.
In this paper, I thus develop a model of the determinants of demand for
heterogeneous products, in which consumers do display a love of variety as
in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977),2 but they are also characterized by a “taste”
1Hummels and Skiba (2004) argue that per unit transportation costs induce ﬁrms to
export high quality goods, while Hallak and Sivadasan (2009) argue that exporter quality
constraints inﬂuence the composition of exports. In this paper, I do not take into account
such supply-side explanations and analyze to what extent the preference structure alone
aﬀects within-industry trade patterns and aggregate trade volume.
2To some extent, the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) utility formulation can be criticized on
the grounds that the love-for-variety motive is an assumption rather than an equilibrium
outcome. In what follows below, I thus return to work demonstrating how this motive can
arise from consumer-ﬁrm speciﬁc taste shocks in a discrete-choice framework similar to
McFadden (1981) and Anderson et al. (1987 and 1992), which I augment by the described
2for good attributes as in Mussa and Rosen (1978). The model features
products that are heterogeneous in their attributes and consumers that are
heterogeneous in their taste for product attributes. The latter two-sided
heterogeneity results in an equilibrium matching in which consumers with
a high preference for a given attribute tend to buy from ﬁrms with a ﬁtting
high-attribute good, i.e., the two-sided heterogeneity leads to an assortative
equilibrium matching of consumer valuations and good attributes.
Consumers are randomly assigned their taste draw. A key assumption
of the model is that ﬁrms can decide with what kind of good to enter the
market. Consequently, in the equilibrium of the closed economy, a high
proportion of consumers with a high taste for the attribute leads to a high
proportion of ﬁrms producing high-attribute goods.3
I nest these preferences in a model of the international economy featur-
ing iceberg transportation costs and two countries that diﬀer in the distri-
bution of consumer tastes. The model comprises the economy described in
Krugman (1980) as a special case without product or taste heterogeneity.
Therefore, I can directly evaluate the eﬀect of such heterogeneity on trade
ﬂows, industrial composition dynamics, and the welfare eﬀects of trade. The
model has three novel main predictions.
The ﬁrst novel prediction is the within-industry extension of Krugman’s
(1980) "home market eﬀect". In Krugman’s model, a country with a larger
home market has more entry of ﬁrms producing manufactured goods for the
domestic market and, with open markets, is also the net exporter of these
goods. This prediction has been extended to the many-industry case by Han-
son and Xiang (2004), who predict that a relative home market eﬀect can
arise across industries with diﬀerent transportation costs or demand struc-
tures. Moreover, as Fajgelbaum et al. (2009) demonstrate, a home market
eﬀect can arise along the dimension of good quality when consumer pref-
erences are non-homothetic: since richer countries have a relatively larger
domestic market for high quality goods, in equilibrium, they also tend to
export of such goods.
The intuition of the within-industry home market eﬀect of this paper
is closely related to the relative notion in Hanson and Xiang (2004) and
Fajgelbaum et al. (2009). Even if two countries, say Germany and France,
are characterized by an equal domestic market size for cars in general, a
home market eﬀect can arise in the type of cars these countries produce.
consumer-good heterogeneity to arrive at micro-founded demand functions featuring both
love of variety and product heterogeneity.
3The fact that ﬁrms can choose with what type of good to enter the industry im-
plies that although ﬁrm’s output is heterogeneous, in general equilibrium, ﬁrms are not
heterogeneous in proﬁtability. The model at hand, therefore, does neither feature trade-
induced shifts in the distribution of ﬁrm-productivities as in Melitz (2003) nor does it
display trade-induced within-ﬁrm shifts in the composition of products as in Bernard et
al. (2009) and Melitz, Mayer, and Ottaviano (2009). I analyze the case where product
attributes are randomly assigned to ﬁrms in Auer (2008).
3For example, if the French consumers put relatively more emphasis on fuel
eﬃciency, while the German consumers tend to emphasize top-speed, in gen-
eral equilibrium, each country’s industry is adapted to the needs of the local
population. Immediately after trade liberalization, France thus becomes a
net exporter of fuel-eﬃcient cars, while Germany becomes a net exporter
of fast cars. Neither of the two economies, however, need to become a net
exporter of cars.4
The model’s second prediction is that in the short run after a trade
liberalization, consumption is home-biased in the sense that the volume of
trade is lower than what would be expected on the basis of transportation
costs and the elasticity of demand.5 Consider the moment just after opening
markets to trade were each country’s industry is optimized for the tastes of
domestic consumers only. While the few German producers of fuel-eﬃcient
cars experience high demand in France, this is more than oﬀset by the
many producers of fast cars that experience low demand in France. Overall,
the volume of trade is reduced by product heterogeneity since the German
industry, which is optimized for the fast car-loving German consumer, is
inappropriate for the average French consumer, who is characterized by a
love for fuel eﬃciency. In the short run, the model thus supports Linder’s
conjecture that taste diﬀerences across nations impede trade.6
The third prediction is that after trade liberalization, the within-industry
home market eﬀect intensiﬁes, while the home bias of consumption disap-
pears. When markets are opened to trade, French ﬁrms experience relatively
more import competition in the segment for fast cars than in the segment
for fuel-eﬃcient cars. Thus, domestic sales and proﬁts are relatively higher
for the makers of fuel-eﬃcient cars. The latter eﬀect is only partly oﬀset
by export possibilities being relatively better for the French makers of fast
cars and the country thus specializes into the fuel-eﬃc i e n tm a r k e ts e g m e n t .
In contrast, the German car industry specializes into producing fast cars,
in turn further reinforcing the specialization in France. In the long run,
countries end up with more specialized industrial structures and the within-
4This example raises the question of whether fast cars and fuel-eﬃcient cars should be
seen as two separate industries. While — for reasons of expositional clarity — the model
developed below features one attribute which can take two possible values, an extension
featuring a continuous distributions of potential values for several attribute dimensions
is straightforward (see Auer (2008)). Every industry is characterized by some degree of
product heterogeneity, the eﬀect of which is analyzed below.
5There is ample empirical evidence that the volume of trade is far lower than what
theory suggests. For example, trade Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) estimate that
conditional on distance, country size, and other observable factors, a border reduces trade
ﬂows in the order of 30-40%.
6Foellmi et al. (2008) document how the non-divisibility of goods can impede the
volume of trade. In their setup, richer individuals demand a larger variety of goods and
richer nations thus oﬀer a market for a large set of diﬀerent varieties. Many of these
varieties cannot be exported to poorer nations since poor consumers can aﬀord only a
narrow set of varieties.
4industry home market eﬀect intensiﬁes.
An intriguing result of the model is that the home bias of consumption
prevailing immediately after trade liberalization vanishes in the long run
although (indeed: because) both economies specialize even more. Consider
again the example of German and French cars. At the moment of opening to
trade, the composition of French industry is tailored exactly to the demand
of French consumers, while the additional import supply from Germany is
concentrated in the fast-car segment. Immediately after trade liberalization,
competition in France is tougher in precisely the segment where German
exports are concentrated in, thus impeding trade.
Dynamically, however, German exporters crowd out French producers
of fast cars. This raises the volume of trade since it makes competition in
France weaker in the segment where Germans exports are concentrated in.
Owing to this, the group of French consumers who do prefer fast cars are not
well served by the domestic industry, leading to higher import demand for
fast cars. As I demonstrate below, as long as specialization is incomplete,
the latter eﬀect is so strong that the home bias of consumption disappears
completely and the long-run volume of trade is exactly equal to the one that
would prevail in the absence of across-country taste diﬀerences.
The dynamic response of industrial composition also has stark results
for the welfare eﬀects of trade: under incomplete specialization, the long
run welfare gains from trade occur to all consumers in the same proportion
irrespective of the foreign distribution of valuations. Again, this somewhat
counter-intuitive result can be explained by how trade aﬀects the composi-
tion of the domestic industry. For example, given that the French produce
a large variety of fuel eﬃcient cars, German consumers with a preference for
fuel eﬃciency do gain more at the moment of liberalization than do the Ger-
man consumers with a preference for speed. Dynamically, however, trade
induces German producers of fuel eﬃcient cars to exit the industry, which
favors the lovers of fast cars. In general equilibrium the these two eﬀects
exactly oﬀset each other and all consumers beneﬁt from trade in the same
proportion irrespective of the distribution of tastes in the other nation.
These ﬁndings document that endogeninzing how a nation’s industrial
composition responds to trade liberalization is of ﬁrst order importance for
understanding trade patterns and the welfare gains from open markets. For
example, Linder’s (1961) often-cited hypothesis hinges on the intuitive idea
that a lower fraction of consumers who value a certain attribute is associ-
ated with a lower volume of imports embodying the attribute. While the
latter statement is true for a given domestic industry structure, the reverse
holds true in general equilibrium: under trade, lower domestic valuation for
an attribute is associated with an over-proportional reduction in domestic
production of goods embodying the attribute, and consequently, a higher
import volume of such goods.
Modelling the dynamic response of industrial composition to trade liber-
5alization and the subsequent increase in trade volumes can also contribute to
our understanding of why trade grows very sluggish after liberalization (see
Yi (2003), Ruhl (2008), and Hummels (2007)). After such liberalization,
each country’s industrial composition has to adapt, which requires ﬁrm exit
and entry and, thus, time. It is also noteworthy that the model predicts a
substantial amount of new trade due to the extensive margin as documented
by Kehoe and Ruhl (2008). In contrast to the existing literature (Arko-
lakis (2008), Baldwin and Harrigan (2007), Bernard et al. (2003), Chaney
(2008), Kugler and Verhoogen (2008), Johnson (2007), Melitz (2003), and
Verhoogen (2008)), this is not driven by the trade-induced shift towards ex-
ante more proﬁtable entities, but rather, by the adaptation of a country’s
industrial composition to the taste structure of a globalized economy.7
The structure of this paper is the following. In section 2, I develop the a
new set of preferences where consumers are characterized by love of variety
and heterogeneity tastes. I analyze the steady state of the closed economy
in section 3. In next open markets to trade and analyze the static impact
of trade liberalization in section 4 and the long run impact in section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
2 A Model of the Demand for Heterogeneous Prod-
ucts
In this section, I develop a preference model that combines two motives of
consumption decisions: the love of variety motive from Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) and the two-sided heterogeneity of good attributes and consumer
valuations developed in Mussa and Rosen (1978).
The world is populated by two countries named Home and Foreign, which
are populated by a mass of L and L∗ consumers respectively. Each consumer
has preferences over a homogenous O (outside) good and over a ﬁnite set of
diﬀerentiated M (manufacturing) varieties. Each M ﬁrm produces exactly
one diﬀerentiated variety that is characterized by its attribute a.E a c h
consumer has a valuation v for the attribute a and is also characterized by
an idiosyncratic and consumer-ﬁrm speciﬁcu t i l i t yd r a wx.
Diﬀerences in attributes a can be seen as diﬀerences in good quality, but
may also reﬂect more trivial product characteristics such as the good’s color
or the language used to label a product. Similarly, diﬀerences in valuations
v reﬂect diﬀerences in people’s tastes for the attribute. For example, some
consumers might have a preference for cars painted in Ferrari Red, while
others prefer British Racing Green. The two-sided heterogeneity results in
an equilibrium matching in which consumers with a preference for green cars
7Cunat and Maﬀezzoli (forthcoming) model a similar structural transition process in
which trade-induced factor accumulation slowly transforms a country’s industrial struc-
ture, leading to a sluggish response of trade volume to liberalization.
6tend to buy from ﬁrms producing green cars, i.e., the two-sided heterogeneity
leads to an assortative equilibrium matching of consumer valuations and
good attributes.8
Consumers also value variety, i.e., they prefer an economy featuring many
diﬀerent varieties of cars painted in British Racing Green to an economy
featuring only one such variety. This love for variety motive is derived from
a discrete choice setting in the spirit of McFadden (1981), Anderson et. al.
(1987 and 1992), and in particular Gabaix et al. (2006). Each consumer
i se n d o w e dw i t ha ni d i o s y n c r a t i ca n dc o n s u m e r - ﬁrm speciﬁcu t i l i t yd r a w
x,r e ﬂecting that a speciﬁc consumer, by chance, might like or dislike the
output of a speciﬁc ﬁrm. Since having a larger number of such draws raises
the expected maximum draw, consumer welfare rises with the number of
available varieties. The love of variety motive partly blurs the assortative
matching of consumer valuations and good attributes, since a high consumer-
ﬁrm speciﬁc utility draw might lead to a consumer buying the good even if
the good’s attributes do not ﬁt the consumer’s valuations very well.
In equilibrium, the economy thus features expected assortative matching,
i.e., consumer valuations and product attributes are on average matched
assortative and a high attribute producer has relatively more consumers
with a high preference for the attribute than a low attribute producer. The
key implication of this matching, in turn, is that a ﬁrm’s sales decrease more
when a new ﬁrm with a similar product enters the industry than when a ﬁrm
with a dissimilar product enters. Therefore, with trade, the composition of
the foreign industry matters for the composition of the domestic industry.
I next lay out the functional forms used in this paper to model these
intuitions, derive a ﬁrm’s demand, and then describe the supply side of the
economy.
2.1 Preferences
Throughout the analysis, let i I index consumers (individuals) and j J index
manufacturing ﬁrms. Each of these consumers i is endowed with income
θi = θ9 in terms of labor and a valuation draw vi. The consumer is also
endowment with a consumer-ﬁrm speciﬁcd r a wxi,j for each ﬁrm in j J.
Consumers care about the valuation- and idiosyncratic draw- adjusted
eﬀective quantity of the manufacturing M good and the absolute quantity
of the outside good O. Denoting the quantity consumer i consumes of the
8For the case of good quality, diﬀerences in valuations mean that while all consumers
do prefer higher quality goods, they do so at diﬀerent rates. See Auer and Chaney (2007
and 2008) and Auer and Saurè (2009) for other applications of the Mussa and Rosen
(1978) model to the open economy.
9The preferences of the model developed below are homothetic so that the model’s
predictions with L equal workers who supply θ units of eﬀective labor each are exactly




7O good by oi and the quantity she consumes from manufacturing ﬁrm j by












Her consumption decision is subject to non-negativity for oi and each




qi,jpj ≤ θi. (2)
The utility function (1) implies that for all consumers, all manufacturing
goods are perfectly substitutable. However, diﬀerent consumers have diﬀer-
ent rates of substitution between diﬀerent varieties; in equilibrium, therefore,
certain types of consumers are more or less likely to buy certain types of
goods.
Consider ﬁrst only the term eajvi in (1).10 The key feature of this term
in the preferences is that the rate at which consumers value (or dislike)
the attribute diﬀers between consumers with diﬀerent vi. Assume that two
consumers of valuations vL and vH >v L are oﬀered to buy a certain good aL
at price pL or a good aH at price pH where aH >a L.W h a ti st h em a x i m u m
price diﬀerence between pL and pH at which each consumer would prefer
the high a good? For the H − valuation consumer, this would be price
ratio pH/pL = evH(aH−al), while it would be pH/pL = evL(aH−aL) for the
L − valuation consumer. Because higher valuation consumers value the
attribute more, in equilibrium, they constitute the relatively larger group of
consumers of H − attribute goods. For expositional clarity, a large part of
the analysis below assumes that vi can take only one of two possible values
vL,v H. However, in general, this assumption is not necessary and valuations
can take any positive value, i.e.,
vi ∼ Fv (v). (3)
fv (v)
½
≥ 0 for v ≥ 0
=0for v<0
Next, consider only the term exi,j in (1). xi,j is a consumer-ﬁrm speciﬁc
shock, reﬂecting the fact that some consumers like or dislike the variety of a
speciﬁc ﬁrm irrespective of the variety’s attribute. In (1), the idiosyncratic
10Both aj and vi are a scalars. It is straightforward to extend the model at hand to the
case of multiple attributes. For example, if each consumer is characterized by independent
valuations over K attribute dimensions, the predictions developed below continue to hold
exactly as long as specialization is incomplete in the K attribute dimensions.
8taste shock introduces market power to the model: although ﬁrms cannot
observe xi,j, they can engage in ﬁrst degree price discrimination by charging
a higher price and only attracting consumers with high xi,j draws. Through-
out the analysis, I assume that xi,j is distributed (maximum) Gumbel with
scale and shape parameters 0 and 1/β respectively.
Gx (xi,j)=e x p[ −exp[−xi,jβ]] (4)
The consumer-ﬁrm speciﬁc shocks are orthogonal to ﬁrm attribute or
consumer valuation and are independent across ﬁrms and consumers: xi,j ⊥
xi,n for n 6= j. Gabaix et al. (2006) demonstrate that these assumptions
in combination with a utility function similar to (1) yield an ideal-variety
microfoundation for the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand
system of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). It is note worthy that the closed-form
assumption on the consumer-ﬁrm speciﬁc taste shocks (4) is not very restric-
tive, since in equilibrium consumers buy only from the attribute-adjusted
maximum realization of xi,j. Since the economy features a large number
of ﬁrms, the distribution of this maxima converges to the Type I Extreme
value function for a wide set of underlying distributions.11
2.2 Demand and Consumer Welfare
In e x ts o l v ef o raﬁrm’s demand and consumer welfare using the general
distribution of valuations Fv (v).C o n s u m e ri consumes the agricultural O




sidering the choice among the single manufactured goods, consider ﬁrst the
decision of how much of the O good to consume. The ﬁrst order conditions
of the utility function (1) with respect to these two quantities and the budget
constraint (2) imply that an agent with income 1 consumes
Mi =( 1− α)/pM,i and Oi = α/pO ,
where pM,i is the price of the manufacturing composite for consumer i
(which is NOT the same for all i). Irrespective of this price, the consumer
always spends a fraction (1 − α) of her income on manufactured goods.
Thus, the consumer spends the remainder fraction of (1 − α) on the
manufacturing composite. Within the manufacturing composite, since all
goods are perfect substitutes, each consumer then chooses the variety that
yields the highest ratio of eﬀective quantity per unit divided by the price of
the variety. Since consumers with diﬀerent valuation vi diﬀer in their average
rate at which they substitute goods of diﬀerent attributes a, demand is of a
diﬀerent shape for each v.
11The preference structure at hand makes the model’s results highly comparable to the
work of Bernard et al. (2003), who extend the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model of trade
to allow for positive markups.
9Proposition 1 (Demand) The demand function D(aj,p j) of a ﬁrm with
attribute aj and price pj is equal to









where Γ(...) is the beta function and P (v) denotes the ideal price index for











The proof of Proposition 1 follows previous research demonstrating how
the love of variety motive can arise in a discrete choice setting: each con-
sumer has a consumer-variety speciﬁct a s t es h o c kxi,j. For equal prizes and
good attributes, the consumer chooses the maximum realization of the taste
shock, i.e., she chooses j =a r gm a x
j J
xi,j. Owing to the functional form as-
sumption that the idiosyncratic taste shocks are distributed Gumbel with
shape parameter 1/β,a l lﬁrms face a constant elasticity of demand equal to
−(1 + β).
Compared to the existing literature, the novel ingredient in the derivation
of (5) is that the probability of consumer i with valuation vi = v buying
from ﬁrm j with attribute aj = a depends on the match of v and a,a sw e l l
as on how well the other goods in the economy match with the consumer’s
taste, i.e., the ideal price index of consumers with vi = v.F i r s t , s a l e s a r e
shifted by the match between the consumer’s taste and the ﬁrm’s attribute,
i . e . ,i n( 5 ) ,d e m a n di ss h i f t e db yexp[βviaj]. Second, it is not only the match
between ﬁrm j and consumer i with vi = v that determines sales, but also
how well the competition’s output matches with the consumers preferences,
i.e., the ideal price index of each consumer type is a function of the attribute
composition of the economy. The latter average match is summarized in the
ideal price index P (v).
The latter two matchings generate the key diﬀerence between the pref-
erence structure of this paper and the existing literature. In existing frame-
works, due to the constant elasticity demand structure, entry of new com-
petitors hurts the sales of all existing ﬁrms in the same proportion. In the
preferences at hand, the eﬀect of such an increase in competition on a ﬁrm’s
sales will be diﬀerent for diﬀerent types of ﬁrms.
Last, there is not one type of consumer, but a distribution of consumers
with varying valuations. Total demand for a ﬁrm equals the sum of demand
from all possible valuations, hence explaining the outer integral over all
possible realizations of v in (5).
10Since the expected maximum draw is increasing in the number of draws,
consumers prefer having a larger number of varieties to choose from, i.e.,
they love variety. A key feature of the preferences developed here is that
consumer welfare is highly comparable to the one in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
Corollary 1 (Consumer Welfare) Denote the expected welfare of con-
sumer i with vi = v and income θi by E (Ui |v,θi).I fpO =1 ,










where the ideal price index P (v) is as deﬁned in (6) and Γ(..) is the gamma
function.
Proof. see Appendix
Corollary 1 is very convenient: the developed preference structure allows
to directly map changes in the toughness of competition for all consumers
with vi = v into welfare changes for this group of consumers. As I docu-
ment below, with open markets, the interplay of the free entry conditions
at Home and abroad pins down the ideal relative price indices for diﬀerent
v’s uniquely, hence leading to very sharp prediction regarding the welfare
eﬀects of trade.
Since both demand is CES-shaped and consumer welfare (up to some
constants) coincides with the one in the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework,
one can directly relate the ﬁndings of this paper to the existing literature.
I nt h ec a s ew h e r ea l lﬁrms produce the same good (an = aj = a), the
valuation-attribute match in (5) cancels out and the demand curve is the
same as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The model at hand, therefore, includes
the Krugman (1980) model as a special case without product heterogeneity,
which is convenient since it allows clearly highlighting the impact of such
heterogeneity.12
2.3 Supply
In each country and at each moment in time, a large set of potential entre-
preneurs can enter the M industry by paying a ﬁxed cost of F labor units.
When entering the industry, each entrepreneur can choose with what type of
attribute to enter the industry. After paying the entry cost F and deciding
12The welfare gains from trade in the model of this paper are also comparable to the
one’s in the literature on ﬁrm heterogeneity. Arkolakis et al. (2009) evaluate the welfare
eﬀects of trade for several such models with heterogeneous ﬁrms, demonstrating that one
can calculate the welfare gains from trade on the basis of knowing only the share of
expenditure on domestic goods and the elasticity of demand. In this paper, the same
holds true.
11with what kind of good to enter the industry, the entrepreneur j receives
the blueprint to produce a new variety of the manufacturing good with at-
tribute aj.W h i l e aj can be chosen at the moment of entry, it cannot be
changed thereafter. The entrepreneur has a perpetual monopoly over that
speciﬁc variety from the moment of entry onwards and faces an exogenous
probability of ﬁrm death of δ>0.
For expositional clarity, I restrict the universe of potential levels the
attribute can take and assume that aj {aL,a H},w h e r e0 <a L <a H.I
refer to the two attribute levels as the H−attribute or L−attribute "good",
"ﬁrm", or "variety" in the remained of the paper.
While alive, each ﬁrm can produce any quantity of its good at constant
marginal costs (in units of labor) equal to
cj = ecaj (7)
∂c(aj)
∂aj can be positive, zero, or negative. For example, if aj measures the
wavelength of the good’s color, it may be the cheapest to produce high
wavelength colors and c<0. If the lowest possible valuation vmin is larger
than 0, it is reasonable to assume that higher aj (higher quality) goods are
more expensive and that c>0.
The outside good O is produced in a competitive sector at a marginal
cost of one unit of labor. In total, the Home economy thus has to satisfy the
resource constraint that domestic production of the O and M sector and
entry into the M sector do not use more than θL units of Home labor.
If markets are opened to trade, manufacturing ﬁrms can sell abroad at
ac o s tc∗
j = τcj,whereτ>1. In contrast, the outside O good can freely be
traded.13
3 Equilibrium in the Closed Economy
I next solve the closed economy equilibrium. To better convey the model’s
intuitions, I solve the two attribute - two valuation case and assume that
vi {f vL, f vH} where f vL < f vH. N o t et h a tw h e nf vL > 0, all consumers value
higher attribute goods and one can speak of good "quality" as in Auer and
Chaney (2007 and 2008), Auer and Saurè (2009), and Fajgelbaum et al.
(2009). In this paper, I however, do not necessarily assume that f vL > 0,s o
that the analysis also extends to product characteristics that is not strictly
preferred by all consumers. I denote the fraction of the population that has
a valuation draw of vi = f vH by 0 ≤ πH ≤ 1.
13The economy does not feature a cost to access the export market as in Melitz (2003).
The key reason for this modeling choice is that in the economy presented in this paper,
ﬁrms are free to choose with what kind of attribute to enter the industry and in equilibrium,
all ﬁrms are equally proﬁtable. Therefore, a ﬁxed cost to access export markets has no
eﬀect on the equilibrium industry composition.









eβ(vi−c)an, i.e., valuations vi can simply be adjusted adjusted by
t h ef a c tt h a ta l s oc o s t sv a r yw i t ha. Thus, in the remainder of the analysis,
I will only evaluate the cost adjusted H − valuations and L − valuations
vH and vL satisfying
vL ≡ (f vL − c) and vH ≡ (f vH − c) .
Throughout the analysis, let N denote the total number of active ﬁrms in
the industry at Home and let nH denote the fraction these ﬁrms producing
a good with aj = aH.N o r m a l i z i n g Γ(1 − β)θ(1 − α) ≡ 1,r e v e n u eΠ(aj)
in the home market economy is equal to
Π(aj)=LπH
eβvHaj




N (nHeβvLaH +( 1− nH)eβvLaL)
Given the constant markup-pricing, ﬁrm proﬁts are proportional to rev-
enue. In the closed economy, this revenue depends on the distribution
of consumer valuations. For any given attribute, a higher proportion of
H − valuation consumers implies a larger market size for H − attribute
ﬁrms.
Similarly, the revenue (8) of a ﬁrm reacts more to entry of ﬁrms pro-

















¯ ¯ ¯. The latter feature implies
that industries are partially segmented: for example, the sales of BMW de-
pend much more on the product strategy of Mercedes rather than the one
of Toyota, which carters to a slightly diﬀerent set of consumers. Similarly,
Armani’s sales depend much more on the success of the latest collections by
Prada than they do depend on the success of the collections Luis Vuitton or
Hermes.
Since cost diﬀerences and attribute diﬀerences can be reduced to one di-
mension only the cost-adjusted valuations vL =( f vL − c) and vH =(f vH − c)
enter the equilibrium demand function (8). A necessary condition for an
equilibrium with positive entry of ﬁr m si st h a t
eβvHaH >e βvHaL and eβvLaL >e βvLaH,
i.e., that no type of good, when adjusted for its relative cost of production,
is preferred by both types of consumers. Throughout the rest of this paper,
I assume this to hold.
With demand being pinned down, it is straightforward to derive entry in
the closed economy. Denoting the value that a variable takes in the autarky
steady state by an A superscript, the following holds.
13Proposition 2 (Autarky Equilibrium) Denote by NA the total number
of ﬁrms in autarky equilibrium and by nA
H [0,1] the autarky equilibrium
fraction of entrepreneurs choosing to produce the H −attribute good. There







0 if πH <e βvLaH eβvHaH−eβvHaL
eβvHaHeβvLaL−eβvHaLeβvLaH
eβvLaL
eβvLaL−eβvLaH πH − (1 − πH) eβvHaL
eβvHaH−eβvHaL otherwise
1 if πH >e βvHaH eβvLaL−eβvLaH
eβvHaHeβvLaL−eβvHaLeβvLaH
. (9)
Proof. Since ﬁrms are free to enter with an H or the L good, an equilibrium
with positive entry of both types of ﬁr m sr e q u i r e st h a tt h eﬂow of revenues





















where P (vH) and P (vL) are the ideal price indices of H− and L−valuation
consumers, which are P (vH)
−β = N
¡





nHeβvHaH +( 1− nH)eβvHaL¢
. Thus, reformulating (10) as




nHeβvHaH +( 1− nH)eβvHaL =
eβvLaL − eβvLaH
nHeβvLaH +( 1− nH)eβvLaL.
(11)
Since eβvHaH >e βvHaL, the LHS of (11) is increasing in relative entry of
H ﬁrms nH.S i n c eeβvLaL >e βvLaH the RHS is decreasing in nH.T h u s ,
nH is uniquely determined. NA depends on the ﬂow of instantaneous proﬁts
which have to be discounted at rate δ and pin down the number of ﬁrms by
the free entry condition F = L
βδNA.
Since eβvHaH >e βvHaL, H − attribute ﬁrms sell more to H − valuation
consumers than do L − valuation ﬁrms. Similarly, eβvLaL >e βvLaH and
L ﬁrms sell more to L − valuation consumers. Sales to each group are
proportional to the number of consumers (there are LπH H − valuation
consumers) and increasing in the ideal price indices P (vH) and P (vL).
It is noteworthy that in general equilibrium, as long as nA
H [0,1], nA
H
is increasing in the number of H − valuation consumers (
∂nA
H
∂πH > 0)a n d
also that nA







0). Furthermore, denoting the autarky equilibrium ideal price indices by












where φ ≡ eβvHaHeβvLaL − eβvHaLeβvLaH > 0. I nt h ea u t a r k ye q u i l i b r i u m
revenue is constant across ﬁrms Π(aH)=Π(aH)= L
NA for any level of πH,
i.e., in equilibrium, the sales of a ﬁrm do not depend on the relative distri-
bution of consumer tastes. The later result is a direct consequence of the
fact that ﬁrms can decide with what kind of product to enter the industry.
Therefore, a higher πH has to be oﬀset exactly by an increase in nH so that
ﬁrms of with diﬀerent attributes still make the same proﬁts, i.e. in the closed
economy, the level of competition for H −. and L−valuation consumers is
proportional to the number of customers πH respectively (1 − πH).
Summarizing, the equilibrium in the closed economy has the following
properties. First, a necessary condition for an equilibrium featuring both
kind of ﬁr m si st h a teβvLaL >e βvLaH and eβvHaH >e βvHaL, i.e., that there
exists both a group of consumers that prefers L g o o d sa sw e l la sag r o u p
that prefers H goods. Second, in an equilibrium featuring positive entry
of both types of ﬁrms, the fraction of H − attribute ﬁr m si si n c r e a s i n gi n
the number of H − valuation consumers. The fraction of such ﬁrms is also
increasing in vH and vL, since an increase in either valuation leads to higher
relative expenditures on H − attribute goods. Third, in equilibrium, owing
to the free entry condition, all ﬁrms have the same revenue and proﬁt ﬂows.
4 The Static Impact of Trade Liberalization
I next examine the immediate impact of an unanticipated trade liberaliza-
tion. In particular, I analyze how such liberalization impacts the economy if
the two countries diﬀer in the fraction of H− and L−valuation consumers
(for expositional clarity I assume that πH ≥ π∗
H) and contrast this to the
static eﬀects of liberalization in the Krugman (1980) economy. As in the
latter work, I also allow for the countries to diﬀer in size L and L∗.14
At the instant after opening markets to trade, the number of ﬁr m si sa t
its autarky level (9). Since accessing the export market is not subject to
any ﬁxed cost, all ﬁrms export and there are NnA
H H − attribute produc-
14The average tastes of consumers in Home and Foreign are assumed to be diﬀerent
for exogenous reasons. Atkin (2009) shows how such taste diﬀerences can be an equilib-
rium outcome of a model featuring habit formation and comparative advantage. In his
work, since the prices of comparative advantage goods are cheaper at home than abroad,
consumers develop a preference for domestically produced good.
15ers exporting from Home to Foreign and N∗nA∗
H H − attribute producers
exporting from Home to Foreign.
The aggregate volume of manufacturing trade is equal to the sum of
trade in H−attribute and L−attribute goods. To understand how product
heterogeneity aﬀects the aggregate volume of trade, it is thus expedient to
evaluate trade volumes in these two segments of the industry. In the do-
mestic economy, a larger share of H − valuation consumers is associated
with a higher number of H − attribute entrants and since πH >π ∗
H,i ti s
also true that nA
H >n A∗
H .S i n c ea l lﬁrms export, Home’s exports are more
H − attribute intensive than is the domestic production in Foreign. Trade,
therefore, intensiﬁes competition more in the sector where the country has
relatively fewer consumers. Denoting the values that variables take imme-
diately at the moment after opening to trade by S and S∗ superscripts, the
following holds.
Lemma 1 (Liberalization and Short Run Relative Competition) Assume
that πH >π ∗
H and nA
H,n A∗
H  ]0,1[. When opening markets to trade, compe-
tition in Home intensiﬁes more in the L−attribute segment of the industry
than in the H − attribute segment, while competition in Foreign intensiﬁes
more in the H − attribute segment of the industry than the L − attribute













Proof. Since accessing the export market is free, all ﬁrms export. With en-












































The above Lemma (1) has two implications. First, since by Corollary
(1) the ideal price index of each group can be mapped one-to-one into wel-
fare changes, the above result implies that when countries diﬀer in their
distributions of tastes, it is the relatively smaller group of consumers that
gains more at the moment of trade liberalization. This result if intuitive: if
markets are opened to trade, a French consumer with a preference for fast
cars suddenly has access to a large number of German fast car varieties. In
contrast, a French consumer with a preference for fuel eﬃcient cars gains
relatively little, since Germany oﬀers few of these varieties compared to the
French industry.
16Second, Lemma (1) is also indicative of why diﬀerences in the distri-
bution of tastes across Home and Foreign reduce the aggregate volume
of trade. The aggregate volume of Home’s exports is equal to the num-
ber of H − attribute ﬁrms times exports per such ﬁrm plus the number of
L−attribute ﬁrms times exports per such ﬁrms. Since trade intensiﬁes com-
petition in Foreign relatively more in the H sector, each Home H−attribute
exporter sells a smaller amount that she would in an economy without prod-
uct heterogeneity. In contrast, each Home L-exporter sells a larger amount
that she would in an economy without product heterogeneity.
Proposition 3 (Short Run Trade Volume) Assume that parameters are
such that nA
H,n ∗A
H  ]0,1[. At the moment after trade liberalization, the fol-
lowing holds. If π∗
H = πH, the volume of trade is the same as in the absence
of consumer heterogeneity and home is a net exporter of the M good iff
L>L ∗.I f πH 6= π∗
H, the volume of trade is lower than in the absence of
consumer heterogeneity and decreasing in |πH − π∗
H|.
Proof. See Appendix
In the model at hand, if there are no diﬀerences in the distributions
of valuations between Home and Foreign (π∗
H = πH), trade volume is the
same as in Krugman (1980), i.e., Home’s export volume is proportional to
NA τ−βL∗
τ−βNA+NA∗ = τ−βLL∗
τ−βL+L∗. The latter volume is decreasing in trade costs,
increasing in the size of the domestic labor force (because a larger domestic
labor force is associated with more domestic ﬁr m s )a n da l s oi nt h es i z eo f
the foreign labor force (since a larger foreign labor force consumes more).
The volume of trade is less than proportionally increasing in τ−β since the
global toughness of competition is increasing in the inverse of trade costs.
Next, consider the impact of taste heterogeneity and assume that πH >
π∗
H. With such preferences, each home ﬁrm faces relatively more demand












τ−βL+L∗. Compared to the benchmark economy without
product heterogeneity, there is thus one sub-sector with larger export vol-
ume and one with smaller export volume per ﬁrm. The overall eﬀect of such
product heterogeneity on the volume of trade is still unambiguously negative
on Home’s export volume, since the losses in the large H−attribute segment
are not fully outweighed by gains in the comparatively small L − attribute
segment.
In the short run, the composition of the domestic industry is not ap-
propriate for the average foreign consumer. This notion of the "appropri-
ateness" of the domestic industry relates well to the notion of appropriate
technology in the endogenous growth literature. For example, Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (2001) show how even when technology is freely adoptable, the
17poorer countries may be less productive because technologies are adapted to
the skill endowment of rich nations and are can only be used sub-optimally
in poor nations. In this paper, in autarky, each country develops an industry
that is suited best to the tastes of the local consumer. In the short run after
opening to trade, the country’s export bundle is inappropriate for the taste
distribution of Foreign consumers.
The model includes Krugman’s classical aggregate home market eﬀect
as a special case when home and foreign share the distribution of consumer
tastes. For the strength of the home bias, the share of H− and L−valuation
consumers is not important, since the returns to scale are equally strong in
the L and H segment of the market. The model also predicts that net
exports can be nonzero even in the case of equal country sizes. In this case,
the direction of net exports is the following: if πH+π∗
H > 1, i.e., if the global
market for the type of good that Home’s exports are concentrated in is large,
Home is a net importer of manufacturing goods. If πH +π∗
H > 1 there are in
more H −valuation consumers than L−valuation consumers in the world
(since L = L∗) and accordingly, there are also more H − attribute ﬁrms in
the world than L−attribute good ones. Global competition is thus tougher
in the H segment of the industry, which happens to be the segment were
home’s exports are concentrated in. Similarly, competition is less tough in
the market segment were foreign exports are concentrated in. Thus, home’s
overall exports are smaller than its imports from foreign if its export tend
to be concentrated in the more competitive industry, which is the case if
πH + π∗
H > 1.
Both reasons for why countries can be net exporters of manufactured
goods have to be interpreted with care, since these predictions rely on trade
in the agricultural sector (the O sector) being costless. As demonstrated by
Davis (1998), the aggregate home market eﬀect does not necessarily arise
once one allows for the possibility that trade in the O sector is also subject
to trade costs. The model at hand, however, also predicts a home market
eﬀect that is not subject to Davis’s critique.
Proposition 4 (The Within-Industry Home Market Eﬀect) Assume
that parameters are such that nA
H,n A∗
H  ]0,1[. At the moment after trade lib-
eralization, if L = L∗, Home is a net exporter of H − attribute goods iﬀ
πH >π ∗
H.I fL 6= L∗ Home’s manufacturing exports contain a larger frac-
tion of H − attribute goods than do Foreign’s exports.
Proof. see Appendix
Proposition 4 presents the model’s second prediction, the within-industry
home market eﬀect. In models following Krugman (1980), a country with a
larger home market for manufacturing goods has more entry of ﬁrms pro-
ducing for the domestic market. Thus, with open markets, this nation is a
net exporter of industrial output. In the model at hand, the intuition of the
18within-industry home market eﬀect is closely related to Hanson and Chen’s
(2004) notion of the relative across-industry home market eﬀect. The within-
industry home market eﬀect is also reminiscent of Fajgelbaum et al.’s (2009)
prediction that richer countries tend to export high-quality goods and im-
port low-quality one’s. Fajgelbaum et al.’s model features non-homogenous
preferences which result in richer consumers tending to buy higher quality
goods. Since a larger fraction of high income consumers is associated with a
larger domestic market for high quality goods, richer nations have a larger
number of high quality producers. When markets are opened to trade, richer
nations thus become net exporters of high quality goods.
In the model at hand, the within-industry home market eﬀect follows
a closely related notion: even if two countries, say Germany and France,
are characterized by an equal domestic market size for cars in general, a
home market eﬀect can arise in the type of cars these countries produce.
If French consumers put relatively more emphasis on fuel eﬃciency, while
German consumers tend to emphasize top-speed, in general equilibrium,
each country’s industry is adapted to the needs of the local population.
Immediately after trade liberalization, France thus becomes a net exporter
of fuel-eﬃcient cars, while Germany becomes a net exporter of fast cars.
Neither of the two economies, however, need to become a net exporter of
cars.
Summarizing, three major trade patterns arise immediately after open-
ing markets to trade. First, if countries are of unequal size, the home market
eﬀect applies and the larger country becomes the net exporter of manufac-
tured goods, while the other country becomes the net exporter of agricultural
goods. Second, even if countries are of equal size, there can be net exports
in each segment of the industry. Third, owing to the diﬀerences in coun-
tries’ average tastes, trade volume is lower than what one would observe in
Krugman’s (1980) model. I next examine whether and to what extent these
predictions hold in general equilibrium.
5 The Steady State In The Open Economy
In the long run equilibrium with open markets each countries’s industrial
composition has adjusted to the distribution of tastes in both Home and
Foreign. In the short run, trade intensiﬁed competition more in the sector
where the trade partner has a relatively larger industry size, hence explaining
why trade volume is rather low: most exporters are in the crowded market
segment. To understand why the home bias of consumption disappears
entirely in the long run, it is again expedient to evaluate how the relative
l e v e lo fc o m p e t i t i o ni nt h eH− and L − attribute segments of the market
develop.
Denoting the value that a variables takes in the long run equilibrium by
19a T superscript, the following holds.
Lemma 2 (Long Run Specialization and Relative Competition ) Assume
that πH >π ∗
H ,π ∗
H >e βvHaL eβaLvL−eβaHvL
φ
¡





πH <e βvHaH eβaLvL−eβaHvL
φ
¡





L , i.e., that parameters
are such that in the long run equilibrium of the open economy nT
H,n T∗
H  ]0,1[.
After trade liberalization, the Home industry specializes into the H−attribute









Proof. Denote by Π(aj) ≡ LπH
e
βvHaj
P(vH)−β + L(1 − πH) e
βvLaj
P(vL)−β the domestic





P(vH)−β +L∗ (1 − π∗
H) e
βvLaj
P∗(vL)−β the domestic revenue of a Foreign ﬁrm
with good aj in the Foreign market. Since all ﬁrms export, face a constant
elasticity of demand, and are subject to iceberg transportation costs, the
export revenue of a Home ﬁrm is equal to τ−βΠ∗ (aj) so that total revenue
of a home ﬁrm is equal to Π(aj)+τ−βΠ∗ (aj). Similarly, the total revenue of
aF o r e i g nﬁrm equals τ−βΠ(aj)+Π∗ (aj). An equilibrium without complete
specialization requires that the discounted sales of an H − attribute and an

































Solving the integral and subtracting τ−β t i m e s( 1 3 )f r o m( 1 2 )y i e l d sΠ(aH)=
Π(aL) and subtracting τ−β times (12) from (13) yields Π∗ (aH)=Π∗ (aL).





















which is the same as in autarky (see Proposition (2)).
Lemma (2) states a surprising and very stark result: regardless of the
relative size of countries and the distribution of the preferences in the other
nation (as long as there is incomplete specialization), the long-run relative
toughness of competition in the H and L segments is the same as in au-
tarky. The underlying intuition for this eﬀect is indeed trivial and derives
from the fact that the home market matters relatively more for Home ﬁrms
than for Foreign ﬁrms, while, in contrast, the Foreign market is relatively
20more important for Foreign ﬁrms than for Home ﬁrms: there can never be
incomplete specialization unless the domestic revenue is equal for an H and
L − attribute ﬁrms in both the Foreign and the Home market.
The intuition of this result if the following. If a Home H − attribute
ﬁrm has higher sales at Home than a Home L − attribute ﬁrm, there must
be some oﬀsetting advantage for L − attribute ﬁrms in the Foreign market
for the free entry condition in Home to hold. Moreover, because the foreign
market matters relatively less than the domestic market due to the existence
of transportation costs, the oﬀsetting advantage for L − attribute ﬁrms in
Foreign must be larger than the advantage for H −attribute ﬁrms at Home.
In contrast, for Foreign ﬁrms transportation costs apply to sales in the Home
market, thus requiring that the Home advantage for H − attribute ﬁrms is
relatively stronger than the L − attribute advantage in Foreign. Together,
these two requirements are inconsistent unless there is not advantage for
either type of ﬁrm in either market.15
The result of Lemma (2) holds irrespective of country size, but only
under the assumption that specialization is incomplete. It is straightforward








w h i l er e l a t i v ee n t r ys a t i s ﬁes
nT
H = nA







1 − τ−2β Λ and (14)
nT∗
H = nA∗







1 − τ−2β Λ, (15)
where Λ = eβvLaL
eβaLvL−eβaHvL + eβvHaL
eβaHvH−eβaLvH . The conditions for incomplete
specialization are thus that πH >π ∗
H >e βvHaL eβaLvL−eβaHvL
φ
¡





L∗ and πH <e βvHaH eβaLvL−eβaHvL
φ
¡





L .C o m -
plete specialization is thus more likely if countries are more unequal in tastes
(higher |πH − π∗
H| or if countries are of more unequal size. Note that the
condition that countries do not specialize in the O sector is less restrictive
than the condition that nT
H and nT∗
H  ]0,1[ if πH 6= π∗
H.I fπH = π∗
H one only
needs the restriction that τ−β < L
L∗ <τ β.
15To formulize this insight, denote the diﬀerence in domestic sales at home between a
H − attibute good and a L − attibute good ﬁrm by Z (Z = Π(aH) − Π(aL))a n dt h e
same diﬀerence in foreign by Z
∗ (Z
∗ = Π
∗ (aH) − Π
∗ (aL)). The free attribute-entry
condition at home implies that Z + τ
−βZ
∗ =0 , while the same condition in Foreign is
τ
−βZ + Z
∗ =0 . Next, note that if Z>0, the free entry condition in home can indeed
hold if −Z
∗ = Z/τ
−β >Z . However, if the latter is the case, the symmetric condition in
foreign would imply that −Z
∗ = τ
−βZ<Z , i.e., only Z = Z
∗ =0can satisfy the free
attribute-entry conditions both at Home and in Foreign.
21If π∗






as long as τ−β > 0. I.e., after trade liberalization, the industrial structure
of the two countries diverges. This result is a direct consequence of the fact
that after opening to trade, in Home, competition is relatively tougher in the
market for L − attribute g o o d st h a ni nt h em a r k e tf o rH − attribute goods
(see Lemma (1)). Although export possibilities are better in the market for
H goods than in the market for L − attribute goods, overall, producers of
H goods make strictly higher proﬁts because the home market is the more
important industry segment (as π∗
H <π H). Consequently, all newly entering
ﬁrms choose to enter the industry with the H−attribute good until the new
equilibrium is reached.
The most important consequence of Lemma (2) is that the long run
relative welfare of H− and L − valuation consumers in both countries is
not aﬀected by trade: although the group which is relatively smaller gains
from having access to a large set of foreign ﬁrms that produce a ﬁtting
good, this is exactly oﬀset by the exit of domestic ﬁrms from this sector. In













. This is the same relative welfare gain that would prevail in
the absence of taste heterogeneity.
We are now in position to describe the aggregate trade patterns in the
long run equilibrium.
Proposition 5 (Long Run Trade Patters) Assume that πH >π ∗
H and
that parameters are such that nT
H,n T∗
H  ]0,1[. The volume of Home’s manu-
facturing exports is equal to LL∗
L+τ−βL∗ for any πH,π∗
H that satisfy the stated
assumptions. If L∗ = L Home has 0 net exports of manufactured goods. If
L>L ∗, Home is a net exporter of manufactured goods. For any combi-
nation of L and L∗ that is consistent with the stated assumptions, Home’s
manufacturing exports are more H −attribute intensive that Foreign’s man-
ufacturing exports. Home’s manufacturing exports are more H − attribute
intensive in the open economy equilibrium than just after trade liberalization.
Proof. see Appendix.
The ﬁrst statement of Proposition 5 is intriguing: although the within-
industry home market eﬀect intensiﬁes, the home bias vanishes completely
if specialization is incomplete. While the intensifying within-industry home
market eﬀect is a straightforward consequence of the increased specialization
(see the previous proposition), the intuition behind the disappearance of the
consumption home bias is less clear at ﬁrst sight. It is expedient to again
analyze why the home bias arises in the ﬁrst place at the moment of trade
liberalization to understand why it later vanishes.
22Consider home’s exports. The dollar volume of trade is equal to the
number of ﬁrms times the sales per ﬁrm. At the moment after opening to
trade, there are nA
H H−attribute good exporters that sell relatively less than
τ−β times their domestic sales on the export markets because competition
is relatively stronger in the foreign H sector than in the domestic H sector.
This is partly oﬀset because the 1−nA
H L−attribute good exporters sell more
than τ−β times their domestic sales on the export markets. However, overall,
the eﬀect overall eﬀect on trade volume is negative since the H−sector is
the more important one for the home economy.
In contrast, steady state trade ﬂows are not aﬀected by the underly-
ing taste diﬀerences across nations. Since the import competition is biased
towards one sector, the domestic industry concentrates into the other sector.








−β, hence implying that exports & domestic revenue per ﬁrm
are the same for H− and L − attribute ﬁrms. Thus, in the steady state
heterogeneity and the composition of exports does not matter for average
trade ﬂows.
Thus, Linder’s (1961) hypothesis does not hold true in general equilib-
rium. It is noteworthy that his argument misses an important insight about
how — in general equilibrium - trade aﬀects a nation’s industrial structure.
His hypothesis hinges on the (intuitive) notion that low domestic taste for an
attribute is associated with a low volume of imports of goods embodying this
attribute. This insight indeed holds if industry structure did not respond to
tastes. However, in general equilibrium, the country in question looses ﬁrms
that produce the type of good for which domestic demand is low, and thus
the country becomes a net importer of the good. In general equilibrium, a
low taste for an attribute is thus associated with a large amount of imports
embodying the attribute.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, I analyze to what extent product attributes, such as the color
or the quality of a good and consumers taste for these attributes inﬂuence
the volume and direction of trade, as well as the welfare eﬀect of trade
liberalization. To this end, I ﬁrst augment the preference structure of Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) with a model of the demand for heterogeneous products.
In addition to their love of variety — which is derived from a discrete choice
setup — consumers are heterogeneous in their taste for product attributes as
in Mussa and Rosen (1978). Products, in turn, are heterogeneous in their
attributes.
Consumers with a high taste for an attribute tend to buy from ﬁrms
with a high-attribute good. The key implication of this assortative match-
23ing is that ﬁrms with similar goods tend to sell to consumers with similar
tastes, i.e., that the industry is endogenously segmented by product at-
tributes. Consequently, with trade, the composition of imports matters for
the composition of the domestic industry.
I next nest these preferences in a model of the international economy
featuring two countries that diﬀer in their average tastes and iceberg trans-
portation costs. The model includes the Krugman (1980) economy as a
special case without product heterogeneity, thus allowing to clearly com-
pare the model’s insights to standard models of the international economy.
The model has three novel predictions. The ﬁrst is the within-industry
extension of Krugman’s (1980) "home market eﬀect". In Krugman’s model,
a country with a larger home market has more entry of ﬁrms producing for
the domestic market. Thus, with open markets, this nation is also the net
exporter of manufactured goods. In the model of this paper, even if two
countries are characterized by an equal domestic market size for cars in gen-
eral, a home bias can arise in the type of the cars these countries produce.
For example, if the French consumers put relatively more emphasis on fuel
eﬃciency, while the German consumers tend to emphasize top-speed, in gen-
eral equilibrium, each country’s industry is adapted to the needs of the local
population. Immediately after trade liberalization, France thus becomes a
net exporter of fuel-eﬃcient cars, while Germany becomes a net exporter
of fast cars. Neither of the two economies, however, needs to become a net
exporter of cars.
The model’s second prediction explains why consumption is home-biased
in the sense that trade volume is lower than what would be expected on the
basis of transportation costs and the elasticity of demand. At the moment
of opening markets to trade, each country’s industry is optimized for the
tastes of domestic consumers. The typical domestic exporter will, therefore,
on average sell less on the export market than would be expected for a
given level of trade costs since the typical foreign consumer is diﬀerent than
what the industry is optimized for: while the few German producers of fuel-
eﬃcient cars experience high demand in France, this is more than oﬀset
by the many producers of fast cars that experience low demand in France.
Overall, the volume of trade is small since the German industry, which is
optimized for the fast-car loving German consumer, is inappropriate for the
average French consumer, who is characterized by a love for fuel eﬃciency.
The third prediction is that after trade liberalization, the within-industry
home market eﬀect intensiﬁes, while the home bias of consumption disap-
pears completely. Consider ﬁrst the reasons for the trade-induced special-
ization and second why specialization erases the home bias. When markets
are opened to trade, French ﬁrms experience relatively more import com-
petition in the segment for fast cars than in the segment for fuel-eﬃcient
cars. Thus, domestic sales and proﬁts are relatively higher for the makers
of fuel-eﬃcient cars. The latter eﬀect is only partly oﬀs e tb ye x p o r tp o s s i -
24bilities being relatively better for the French makers of fast cars. Overall,
the country thus specializes into the fuel-eﬃc i e n tm a r k e ts e g m e n t .
An intriguing result of the model is that the home bias of consump-
tion prevailing immediately after trade liberalization vanishes in the long
run although both economies specialize even more. The reason for this is
that as countries specialize into the segment where they have a relatively
larger domestic demand, they make room for foreign exporters in the other
segment of the market. Since the latter happens to be exactly the market
segment where the trade partner’s industry is concentrated in, trade volume
increases.
The model thus documents that Linder’s (1961) hypothesis misses an
important insight about how trade aﬀects a nation’s industrial structure in
general equilibrium. His hypothesis hinges on the (intuitive) notion that low
domestic taste for an attribute is associated with a low volume of imports
of goods embodying this attribute. This insight indeed holds for a given in-
dustrial structure. However, in general equilibrium, the country in question
looses many of its ﬁrms that produce such goods and the country becomes a
net importer of goods embodying that attribute. Thus, directly opposed to
the intuition underlying Linder’s hypothesis, imports tend to over propor-
tionally include product attributes for which the domestic consumers has a
low preference for.
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307A p p e n d i x : P r o o f s
Proposition 1 (reminded) Denote the demand function of a ﬁrm with
attribute aj and charging price pj by D(aj,p j). Demand is determined by









where Γ(...) is the beta function and P (v) denotes the ideal price index for










Proposition 6 Proof. A consumer with valuation e v buys only from the
ﬁrm the ﬁrm oﬀering the cheapest per unit good, adjusted for the idio-





pj . Since the distribution of xi,jis continuos the probability
of ties is 0.
From the ﬁrm side, (expected) demand from consumer e v with an unknown
realization of xi,j is then equal to the probability that the ﬁrm’s draw xi,j,
adjusted for the ﬁrms’ price and the match of aj and e v is the maximum
of all adjusted draws. Since each consumer spends (1 − α)θi on the manu-
facturing composite, spends it all on one variety only, sales are then equal
to

















































=P r ( xi,n < ln(pn) − ln(pj)+( aj − an)e v + xi,j)dxi,j
If all x are distributed Gumbel with scale parameter 0 and shape parameter






Pr(xi,n < ln(pn) − ln(pj)+( aj − an)e v + xi,j)

























and Demand from group e v can be conveniently be expressed as
























































































Since the latter part can be expressed as the CDF of a Gumbel shock, we get
demand per from a mass 1 of consumers with valuation e v


















































Corollary 1 (reminded). Denote the expected welfare of consumer i
with vi = v and income θi by E (Ui |v,θi).I fpO =1 ,










where the ideal price index P (v) is as deﬁn e di n( 6 )a n dΓ(..) is the gamma
function.
Corollary 2 Proof. The consumer only buys from the draw and match-







on this j∗ (i),c o n s u m e ri maximizes











Implying that the value of the Langragian multiplier, or the marginal util-








.W i t hpO normalized to 1, the utility for a given maxi-
mum realization of xi,j∗(i) + aj∗(i)vi is thus











33denote the cdf of e Ui = Ui
.
(1 − α)














































































































































Proposition (Short Run Trade Volume) 3 (reminded) Assume that pa-
rameters are such that nA
H,n ∗A
H  ]0,1[. At the moment after trade liberaliza-
tion, the following holds. If π∗
H = πH, the volume of trade is the same as
in the absence of consumer heterogeneity and home is a net exporter of the
34M good iff L > L∗.I fπH 6= π∗
H, the volume of trade is lower than in the
absence of consumer heterogeneity and decreasing in |πH − π∗
H|.
Proof. Denote the total value of exports at the moment after opening
markets to trade by XS and XS∗ and the attribute speciﬁct r a d eﬂows by
an additional H or L s u b s c r i p t . F o re a c ht y p eo fg o o d ,t h ev a l u eo ft r a d e
is proportional to the number of ﬁrms of each type and the sales per such





























The two ideal price indices for foreign H- and L − valuation consumers are







τ−βLL∗ (1 − πH)(1− π∗
H)










τ−βLL∗ (1 − π∗
H)(1− πH)

















































NA+τ−βNA∗ if πH 6= π∗
H
,
which veriﬁes the ﬁrst two claims of proposition 3 . Next, setting πH = π∗
H in
(20) and (19) yields X −X∗ = τ−βLL∗
L+τ−βL∗ − τ−βLL∗
τ−βL+L∗, which has the described




















. The latter expression is 0 whenever πH+π∗
H =1 ,
positive if πH + π∗
H < 1 and πH ≥ π∗
H, and negative if πH + π∗
H < 1 and
πH ≥ π∗
H. The latter sign is reversed if πH <π ∗
H. A similar calculation for
35foreign yields (20). Thus, if L = L∗ and πH 6= π∗







> 0 if πH + π∗
H < 1
=0if πH + π∗
H =1
< 0 if πH + π∗
H < 1
.
It is noteworthy that due to the presence of the O sector, wages are equal
across the two countries and thus a net trade ﬂow in labor units is equal to
a net trade ﬂow in Dollars.
Proposition (Short Run Within-industry Home Market Eﬀect) 4 As-
sume that parameters are such that nA
H,n A∗
H  ]0,1[.A t t h e m o m e n t a f t e r
trade liberalization, if L = L∗, Home is a net exporter of H − attribute
goods iﬀ πH >π ∗
H.I f L 6= L∗ Home’s manufacturing exports contain a
larger fraction of H − attribute goods than do Foreign’s exports.
Proof. Home’s net exports of H −attribute goods are equal to the number


























For the case of L = L∗, taking into account the toughness of competition in

































are larger than 0, XH − X∗
H > 0 for πH >π ∗
H.































































































































































for πH >π ∗
H
Proposition 5 (reminded) Assume that πH >π ∗
H and that parameters
are such that nT
H,n T∗
H  ]0,1[. The volume of Home’s manufacturing exports
is equal to LL∗
L+τ−βL∗ for any πH,π∗
H that satisfy the stated assumptions. If
L∗ = L Home has 0 net exports of manufactured goods. If L>L ∗,H o m ei s
a net exporter of manufactured goods. For any combination of L and L∗ that
is consistent with the stated assumptions, Home’s manufacturing exports are
more H −attribute intensive that Foreign’s manufacturing exports. Home’s
manufacturing exports are more H−attribute intensive in the open economy
equilibrium than just after trade liberalization.
Proof. H o m e ’ sE x po r t sa n dI m po r t so fg ood st h a te m bod yt h eH−attribute
are proportional to the number of domestic respectively foreign H ﬁrms.








































Because each H − attribute and L − attribute producer of a country
exports the same amount, the composition of the industry does not aﬀect
the overall volume of exports.
XT = XT
H + XT
L = NT L∗τ−β







L = NT∗ Lτ−β





and Home’s net exports of manufactured goods equal
XT − XT∗ =( L − L∗)
τ−β
1+τ−β




=( πH − π∗
H)
eβaLvL

































H and after trade liberalization , an H−attribute ﬁrm















387.1 The case of Complete Specialization.
What happens if parameters are such that one country specializes completely
in one sector? There are two cases: complete specialization in both countries
and complete specialization in only one country.
7.1.1 One Country Specializes
Assume for example that Home specializes completely in the H−sector,




so, one can subtract
τ−βΠ(aH)+Π∗ (aH) − Fδβ− τ−β
³
































































































7.1.2 Both Countries Specialize nH =1n∗
H =0
P (vH)
−β = NeβvHaH + τ−βN∗eβvHaL
P (vL)
−β = NeβvLaH + τ−βN∗eβvLaL
P∗ (vH)
−β = τ−βNeβvHaH + N∗eβvHaL
P∗ (vL)
−β = τ−βNeβvLaH + N∗eβvLaL
P (vH)
−β = NH+ τ−βN∗
P (vL)
−β = N + τ−βN∗H
P∗ (vH)
−β = τ−βNH+ N∗
P∗ (vL)
−β = τ−βN + N∗H







































Lets ﬁrst solve this for the absolutely symmetric case eβvHaL = eβvLaH =






as in non-complete specialization.
41